The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit

作     者：Xian-Jia Wang Wen-Man Chen 王先甲;陈文嫚

作者机构：Economics and Management SchoolWuhan UniversityWuhan 430070China Institute of System and EngineerWuhan UniversityWuhan 430070China 

出 版 物：《Chinese Physics B》 (中国物理B（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2019年第28卷第8期

页      面：22-30页

核心收录：

学科分类：07[理学] 0702[理学-物理学] 

基　　金：Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871171 71871173 and 71701076) 

主　　题：evolutionary game theory cooperation deposit weak altruism discount rate 

摘      要：The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior *** introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed ***,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit *** players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is ***,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator *** computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good *** the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the *** the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.