The Strategy of Escalation and Negotiation: The Iran Nuclear Dispute

作     者：Tobias W. Langenegger Keith W. Hipel 

作者机构：Department of Management Technology and Economics ETH Zurich Zurich Switzerland Department of Systems Design Engineering University of Waterloo Waterloo Ontario Canada 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 (系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2019年第28卷第4期

页      面：434-448页

核心收录：

学科分类：07[理学] 08[工学] 

基　　金：The authors would like to sincerely thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions that improved the clarity and quality of this paper 

主　　题：Negotiation Graph Model for Conflict Resolution Iran US nuclear security economic sanctions 

摘      要：The strategic decisions and resulting consequences surrounding the conflict between the United States of America (US) and Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear program are formally investigated using a flexible decision methodology called the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). This highly controversial dispute caught the world s attention as concerns were growing that Iran would reach a position where it would be able to build nuclear weapons, thereby posing a risk to world security. While Iran insisted on its rights for the peaceful use of nuclear technology;the international community;led by the US, tried to discourage the nuclear activities of Iran to ensure its obligations to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This led to an escalation of tension on both sides, with an extension of the nuclear program by Iran and an increase in sanctions by the US, before it was possible to arrive at a negotiated agreement. As demonstrated in this paper, a systematic GMCR investigation provides valuable strategic insights into this important conflict. Further, it illustrates ways in which the conflict could have evolved, as well as mechanisms for stopping an escalation like this in the future.