Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management： Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan

作     者：Bing Ni 

作者机构：Xi＇an Jiaotong University and is working for Guangdong Development Bank Shenzhen Branch518031 

出 版 物：《Chinese Business Review》 (中国经济评论（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2005年第4卷第1期

页      面：64-68,81页

学科分类：02[经济学] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 020101[经济学-政治经济学] 

主　　题：corporate governance ownership structure managerial entrenchmentshareholders activism 

摘      要：Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.