Local Officials' Incentives and China's Economic Growth:Tournament Thesis Reexamined and Alternative Explanatory Framework

作     者：Fubing Su Ran Tao Lu Xi Ming Li 

作者机构：Department of Political ScienceVassar College School of EconomicsRenmin University of China Department of Agricultural Economics School of EconomicsPeking University 

出 版 物：《China & World Economy》 (中国与世界经济（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2012年第20卷第4期

页      面：1-18页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 1204[管理学-公共管理] 120401[管理学-行政管理] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 020105[经济学-世界经济] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：financial support from the China National Social Science Foundation key project(11-ZD037) the British SPF fund the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities the Research Funds of Renmin University of China over our fieldwork in the past several years 

主　　题：career incentive China local state developmentalism tournament thesis 

摘      要：To explain China＇s dramatic economic growth, researchers have proposed a ＂tournament thesis. ＂＂ According to this thesis, the central government＇s ability to set growth targets has played a crucial role in growth since political promotion is largely based on local economic growth. We use provincial officials＂ career mobility data to test this thesis. For both time periods （1979-1995 and 1979-2002）, economic performance, measured in annual, average and relative terms, did not affect these officials＇ career advancement. We then sketch an alternative analytical framework to explain Chinese local officials＇ strong urge for developmentalism and, finally, draw policy implications from this explanatory framework.