Marx on Nature

作     者：James Swindal 

作者机构：Department of Philosophy Duquesne University Pittsburgh PA 15282 USA 

出 版 物：《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》 (中国哲学前沿（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2014年第9卷第3期

页      面：358-369页

学科分类：030504[法学-国外马克思主义研究] 03[法学] 030501[法学-马克思主义基本原理] 08[工学] 0822[工学-轻工技术与工程] 0305[法学-马克思主义理论] 

主　　题：Kant Marx Engels nature ecology 

摘      要：Ecological Marxists argue that Marx forged a view of nature compatible with more recent models of environmentalism. John Bellamy Foster argues that Marx ascribed an ecological value to nature by asserting a co-evolution between man and nature. James O＇Connor presents a more nuanced view in which Marx at best defended a conservationist defense of nature. I argue that such ecological views of Marx tend to overlook his abandonment of an ontology of nature as a totality of relations among physical objects with respect to their interactions and mutual preservation and order. He followed Kant in reducing nature, or the physical world, effectively to a regulative notion, thus reducing its value to a simply a heuristic one for judgments about and actions towards objects. But he also radicalized this reduction by envisaging nature only as a material field of fungible and consumable things, such that each thing is a mere locus of energy or force that human labor cannot substantively perfect but only change to a function. Labor in this view creates new arrangements of natural things for a singular ultimate purpose： the formation of associations of free labor. I conclude that Marx＇s thinking thus cannot be utilized to support an environmental philosophy, such as deep ecology or eco-socialism, that would posit any intrinsic value to nature.