Real-time state recovery attack against MORUS in nonce-misuse setting

作     者：Tairong SHI Jie GUAN 

作者机构：Information Science and Technology Institute 

出 版 物：《Science China(Information Sciences)》 (中国科学:信息科学(英文版))

年 卷 期：2019年第62卷第3期

页      面：214-216页

核心收录：

学科分类：0808[工学-电气工程] 08[工学] 0839[工学-网络空间安全] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61572516  61602514  61272041  61272488) 

主　　题：Real-time state recovery attack against MORUS in nonce-misuse setting Si Pi 

摘      要：Dear editor,CAESAR [1] is a large-scale cryptographic competition supported by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, which mainly calls for authenticated ciphers. MORUS [2], an authenticated stream cipher, has been selected as one of the third-round candidates. As a nonce-based scheme,