Audit pricing and nature of controlling shareholders:Evidence from France

作     者：Chiraz Ben Ali Cdric Lesage 

作者机构：IPAG Business SchoolFrance HEC ParisFrance 

出 版 物：《China Journal of Accounting Research》 (中国会计学刊（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2013年第6卷第1期

页      面：21-34页

学科分类：120201[管理学-会计学] 12[管理学] 120202[管理学-企业管理（含：财务管理、市场营销、人力资源管理）] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 

基　　金：the financial support of the Fondation HEC (Project F0802) the INTACCT program (European Union, Contract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035850) 

主　　题：Audit fees Controlling shareholder identity Minori 

摘      要：This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from Simunic(1980), we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show:(1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings;(2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and(3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.