Set-theoretic detection of data corruption attacks on cyber physical power systems

作     者：Efstathios KONTOURAS Anthony TZES Leonidas DRITSAS 

作者机构：Electrical and Computer Engineering Department University of Patras Electrical and Computer Engineering Program New York University Abu Dhabi Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Educators School of Pedagogical and Technological EducationASPETE 14121 Athens Greece 

出 版 物：《Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy》 (现代电力系统与清洁能源学报（英文）)

年 卷 期：2018年第6卷第5期

页      面：872-886页

核心收录：

学科分类：080802[工学-电力系统及其自动化] 0808[工学-电气工程] 08[工学] 

主　　题：Power systems Load frequency control Cyber-attacks Set-theoretic methods 

摘      要：This paper addresses a set-theoretic method for the detection of data corruption cyber-attacks on the load frequency control loop of a networked power system. The system consists of several interconnected control areas forming a power grid. Based on the overall discrete-time network dynamics, a convex and compact polyhedral robust invariant set is extracted and is used as a set-induced anomaly detector. If the state vector exits the invariant set,then an alarm will be activated, and the potential threat is considered disclosed. The attack scenario used to assess the efficiency of the proposed anomaly detector concerns corrupted frequency sensor measurements transmitted to the automatic generation control unit of a compromised control area. Simulation studies highlight the ability of a set-theoretic approach to disclose persistent and intermittent attack patterns even when they occur at the same time with changes in the power load demand.