An Efficient Technique to Reverse Engineer Minterm Protection Based Camouflaged Circuit
An Efficient Technique to Reverse Engineer Minterm Protection Based Camouflaged Circuit作者机构：Department of Computer Science and Technology Wuhan University of Technology Wuhan 430070 China Department of Computer Science and Technology Tsinghua University Beijing 10084 China
出 版 物：《Journal of Computer Science & Technology》 (计算机科学技术学报（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2018年第33卷第5期
页 面：998-1006页
核心收录：
学科分类：080903[工学-微电子学与固体电子学] 12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 0809[工学-电子科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 08[工学]
基 金：This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 61774091
主 题：reverse engineering circuit camouflaging sensitization and implication minterm perturbation
摘 要：Integrated circuit （IC） camouflaging technique has been applied as a countermeasure against reverse engineering （RE）. However, its effectiveness is threatened by a boolean satisfiability （SAT） based de-camouflaging attack, which is able to restore the camouflaged circuit within only minutes. As a defense to the SAT-based de-camouflaging attack, a brand new camouflaging strategy （called CamoPerturb） has been proposed recently, which perturbs one minterm by changing one gate＇s functionality and then restores the perturbed circuit with a separated camouflaged block, achieving good resistance against the SAT-based attack. In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of CamoPerturb by illustrating the mechanism of minterm perturbation induced by gate replacement, then propose an attack to restore the changed gate＇s functionality, and recover the camouflaged circuit. The attack algorithm is facilitated by sensitization and implication principles in automatic test pattern generation （ATPG） techniques. Experimental results demonstrate that our method is able to restore the camouflaged circuits with very little time consumption.
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