A Method to Implement Full Anonymous Attestation for Trusted Computing Platform

作     者：HAO Liming SUN Xun YANG Shutang LU Songnian HAO Liming, SUN Xun, YANG Shutang, LU Songnian School of Electronic, Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China

作者机构：School of Electronic Information and Electrical EngineeringShanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai 200240 China 

出 版 物：《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》 (武汉大学学报（自然科学英文版）)

年 卷 期：2007年第12卷第1期

页      面：101-104页

学科分类：0839[工学-网络空间安全] 08[工学] 081201[工学-计算机系统结构] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：Supported by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (2005AA145110) 

主　　题：trusted computing trusted platform module direct anonymous attestation 

摘      要：Trusted computing （TC） technology is brought out by trusted computing group （TCG） to make computing as safe and reliable as people expect. Attestation is one main function specified by TCG, which is the means by which a trusted computer assures a remote computer whose platform is not tampered with. There are two protocols that implement attestation without disclosing the platform＇s real identity, which are Privacy CA-based protocol and direct anonymous attestation （DAA） protocol. However, in the first protocol the privacy CA is the bottleneck and the platform＇s identity will be disclosed if the privacy CA is compromise, while DAA protocol can do profiling when dealing with rogue hardware device. In this paper, we propose a DAA-extended new approach to ensure full anonymous attestation that can not only detect a rogue TPM, but also reveal rogue TPM＇s real identity.