A sequential model of bargaining in logic programming

作     者：Wu CHEN Dongmo ZHANG Maonian WU 

作者机构：College of Computer and Information Science Southwest University Chongqing 400715 China Center for the Study of Logic and Intelligence Southwest University Chongqing 400715 China School of Computing Engineering and Mathematics University of Western Sydney Penrith NSW 2751 Australia School of Information Engineering Huzhou University Huzhou 313000 China 

出 版 物：《Frontiers of Computer Science》 (中国计算机科学前沿（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2015年第9卷第3期

页      面：474-484页

核心收录：

学科分类：0810[工学-信息与通信工程] 12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 0808[工学-电气工程] 081104[工学-模式识别与智能系统] 08[工学] 0835[工学-软件工程] 0701[理学-数学] 0811[工学-控制科学与工程] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 081202[工学-计算机软件与理论] 

基　　金：国家自然科学基金 the Major Project of National Social Science of China the first author was also supported in part by the the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities 

主　　题：bargaining logic programming sequentialmodel abduction 

摘      要：This paper proposes a sequential model of bar- gaining specifying reasoning processes of an agent be- hind bargaining procedures. We encode agents＇ background knowledge, demands, and bargaining constraints in logic pro- grams and represent bargaining outcomes in answer sets. We assume that in each bargaining situation, each agent has a set of goals to achieve, which are normally unachievable with- out an agreement among all the agents who are involved in the bargaining. Through an alternating-offers procedure, an agreement among bargaining agents may be reached by ab- ductive reasoning. We show that the procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each agent makes rational offers/counter- offers in each round. In addition, the sequential model also has a number of desirable properties, such as mutual commit- ments, individual rationality, satisfactoriness, and honesty.