Spear and Shield： Evolution of Integrated Circuit Camouflaging
Spear and Shield： Evolution of Integrated Circuit Camouflaging作者机构：Department of Computer Science and Technology Tsinghua University Beijing 100083 China Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering UniversiLy of Maryland College Park MD 20740 U.S.A.
出 版 物：《Journal of Computer Science & Technology》 (计算机科学技术学报（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2018年第33卷第1期
页 面：42-57页
核心收录：
学科分类：080903[工学-微电子学与固体电子学] 0710[理学-生物学] 0808[工学-电气工程] 0809[工学-电子科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 07[理学] 08[工学] 09[农学] 0835[工学-软件工程] 0701[理学-数学] 0811[工学-控制科学与工程] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）]
主 题：circuit camouflaging reverse engineering intellectual property (IP) protection hardware security
摘 要：Intellectual property （IP） protection is one of the hardcore problems in hardware security. Semiconductor industry still lacks effective and proactive defense to shield IPs from reverse engineering （RE） based attacks. Integrated circuit （IC） camouflaging technique fills this gap by replacing some conventional logic gates in tile IPs with specially designed logic cells （called camouflaged gates） without changing the functions of tile IPs. The camouflaged gates can perform different logic functions while maintaining an identical look to RE attackers, thus preventing them from obtaining the layout information of the IP directly from RE tools. Since it was first proposed in 2012, circuit camouflaging has become one of the hottest research topics in hardware security focusing on two fundamental problems. How to choose the types of camouflaged gates and decide where to insert them in order to simultaneously minimize the performance overhead and optimize the RE complexity？ How can an attacker de-camouflage a camouflaged circuit and complete the RE attack？ In this article, we review the evolution of circuit camouflaging through this spear and shield race. First, we introduce the design methods of four different kinds of camouflaged ceils based on true/dummy contacts, static random access memory （SRAM）, doping, and emerging devices, respectively. Then we elaborate four representative de-camouflaging attacks： brute force attack, IC testing based attack, satisfiability-based （SAT-based） attack, and the circuit partition based attack, and the corresponding countermeasures： clique-based camouflaging, CamoPerturb, AND-tree camouflaging, and equivalent class based camouflaging, respectively. We argue that the current research efforts should be on reducing overhead introduced by circuit camouflaging and defeating decamouflaging attacks. We point out that exploring features of emerging devices could be a promising direction. Finally, as a complement to circuit camouflaging, we concl
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