Influence of Strategy Continuity on Cooperation in Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Games with Migrating Players

作     者：ZHAO Xiaowei XIA Haoxiang 

作者机构：Institute of Systems Engineering Dalian University of Technology Dalian 116024 Liaoning China School of Software Technology Dalian University of Technology Dalian 116620 Liaoning China 

出 版 物：《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》 (武汉大学学报（自然科学英文版）)

年 卷 期：2018年第23卷第1期

页      面：1-8页

核心收录：

学科分类：0711[理学-系统科学] 12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 08[工学] 0811[工学-控制科学与工程] 081103[工学-系统工程] 

基　　金：Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61702076,71371040,71533001,71371040) the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(DUT17RW131) 

主　　题：evolution of cooperation continuous strategies spatial prisoner's dilemma game migration 

摘      要：The phenomenon of cooperation is prevalent in both nature and human society. In this paper a simulative model is developed to examine how the strategy continuity influences cooperation in the spatial prisoner＇s games in which the players migrate through the success-driven migration mechanism. Numerical simulations illustrate that the strategy continuity promotes cooperation at a low rate of migration, while impeding cooperation when the migration rate is higher. The influence of strategy continuity is also dependent on the game types. Through a more dynamic analysis, the different effects of the strategy continuity at low and high rates of migration are explained by the formation, expansion, and extinction of the self-assembled clusters of ＂partial-cooperators＂ within the gaming population.