Neuroscientific Evidence Against Depression as an Evolutionary Adaptation

作     者：Gonzalo Munevar Donna Irvan 

作者机构：Lawrence Technological University Southfield USA 

出 版 物：《Psychology Research》 (心理学研究：英文版)

年 卷 期：2013年第3卷第6期

页      面：358-363页

学科分类：0710[理学-生物学] 1002[医学-临床医学] 07[理学] 071006[理学-神经生物学] 100205[医学-精神病与精神卫生学] 10[医学] 

主　　题：神经科学 科学证据 抑郁症 进化 额叶皮层 有害病原体 神经解剖学 安德鲁斯 

摘      要：We will discuss evidence from neuroscience against the hypothesis that depression is cognitively adaptive. A recent version of the notion that depression has adaptive value has been proposed by Andrews and Thomson. Their analytical rumination hypothesis holds that in entering depression an individual is better able to allocate cognitive resources to the very problems that triggered the depressive episode. The result is that depression allows for more analytical and focused thinking about ones most serious personal problems. Depression would thus be adaptive in a way analogous to disease responses such as fever, which gives an advantage to white blood cells over harmful pathogens, thus making it more likely that the individual organism will survive. It is unpleasant but advantageous. Evidence from neuroscience, however, casts doubt on this hypothesis. Some of the key areas involved in the neuroanatomical circuit of depression, such as the PFC (prefrontal cortex), the dorsal ACC (anterior cingulate cortex), and the amygdala-hippocampal path, when adversely affected, lead instead to impaired memory and concentration. Studies have found that depressed patients exhibit cell death and reduced volume in the PFC, decreased activity in the dorsal ACC, and increased volume in the amygdala, while the hippocampus volume is decreased, both of which might be expected to lead to difficulties with memory and problem-solving. Furthermore, some of these areas are critical to the allocation of cognitive resources, thus making the analytical rumination hypothesis even more implausible.