An Analysis on the Inconsistency of the Security Supervision Policy in the Method of Game Theory
An Analysis on the Inconsistency of the Security Supervision Policy in the Method of Game Theory作者机构：CollegeofEconomicsandmanagement.SouthwestJiaotongUniversityChengdu610031China CollegeofmathematicsandInformationSci-enceHenanuniversityKaifeng475001China
出 版 物：《Chinese Quarterly Journal of Mathematics》 (数学季刊（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2003年第18卷第1期
页 面：93-98页
核心收录：
学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学]
基 金：SupportedbyCadremanTeacherFoundationofAltitudeCollegeofHenanProvince(2 0 0 1 number 2 2 5)
主 题：security supervision policy game
摘 要：This article expounds and proves the basic model of the inconsistency of the security supervision policy and makes an analysis in the method of game theory on the inconsistency of the security transaction-tax-rate policy, concludes that the security supervision department is inclined to increase or decrease the security transaction tax rate, thus points out ways for supervision department to surmount this difficulty.
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