A survey of executive compensation contracts in China's listed companies

作     者：Yubo Lia Fang Lou Jiwei Wang Hongqi Yuan 

作者机构：Sydney Institute of Language and Commerce Shanghai University School of Economics Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Accountancy Singapore Management University School of Management Fudan University 

出 版 物：《China Journal of Accounting Research》 (中国会计学刊（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2013年第6卷第3期

页      面：211-231页

学科分类：120202[管理学-企业管理（含：财务管理、市场营销、人力资源管理）] 12[管理学] 02[经济学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 020204[经济学-金融学（含∶保险学）] 

基　　金：the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC No.71272074) the Excellent Young Professors Program of the Shanghai Government 

主　　题：Executive compensation Voluntary disclosure Incentives Performance measures 

摘      要：We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation ***, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.