SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE FOR DETERIORATING ITEMS WITH COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING
SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE FOR DETERIORATING ITEMS WITH COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING作者机构：College of Management and Economics Tianjin University Tianjin 300072 China
出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 (系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2017年第26卷第1期
页 面：23-49页
核心收录：
基 金：国家自然科学基金 Humanity and Social Science Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China 国家教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划
主 题：Deteriorating items cooperative advertising supply chain performance differential game
摘 要：To study the effect of cooperative advertising on the supply chain of deteriorating items, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model for a two-echelon deteriorating items supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under a given support program with an exogenous participation rate. The manufacturer as the leader determines the wholesale price and production rate, and the retailer as the follower determines the retail price and advertising strategies. The strategies of the players under the decentralized scenario and the centralized scenario are respectively characterized. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis are conducted to gain some managerial insights. It is shown that the pricing, advertising and production strategies are negatively correlated to deteriorating coefficient, and both the profit and the channel efficiency decrease with deteriorating coefficient; The interaction between price, advertising investment and production rate results in a higher retail price of the centralized channel compared to that of the decentralized channel; Implementing the cooperative advertising program does improve the performance of the supply chain in some cases and the participation rate roughly at 0.5 is most preferable, but it is also possible to distort incentive and damage the channel performance when the participation rate reaches a relatively high level.
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