Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Quantum Hawk-Dove Game

作     者：Ahmad Nawaz A. H. Toor 

作者机构：National Centre for Physics Quaid-i-Azam University Campus Islamabad Pakistan Department of Physics Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad 45320 Pakistan 

出 版 物：《Chinese Physics Letters》 (中国物理快报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2010年第27卷第5期

页      面：12-15页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 0809[工学-电子科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 070205[理学-凝聚态物理] 08[工学] 0805[工学-材料科学与工程（可授工学、理学学位）] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0704[理学-天文学] 0701[理学-数学] 0702[理学-物理学] 

主　　题：Dove game game pure 

摘      要：We quantize the Hawk-Dove game by using the most general form of a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed evolutionarily stable strategies （ESS）. An example is considered to draw a comparison between the classical and quantum version of the game. Our choice of the most general initial quantum state enables us to make the game symmetric or asymmetric. We show that for a particular set of game parameters where there exists only mixed ESS in the classical version of the game, quantization allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for the symmetric game in addition to mixed ESS. On the other hand only pure strategy ESS can exist for the asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk-Dove game.