Deferred Executive Compensation Policies in Chinese State-owned Enterprises

作     者：Min Ju 

作者机构：PhD student John Cook School of Business Saint Louis University USA. Email: yulanju@***. 

出 版 物：《China & World Economy》 (中国与世界经济（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2007年第15卷第4期

页      面：102-117页

核心收录：

学科分类：120202[管理学-企业管理（含：财务管理、市场营销、人力资源管理）] 12[管理学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 

主　　题：Chinese industrial reform deferred compensation policy executive compensation 

摘      要：Since the commencement of industrial reform in Chinna, most CHinese state-owneu enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiveness of such a policy needs to be evaluated In this paper, we specify a model of deferred executive compensation policy, in which the compensation for executives is contingent on firms ＇future revenue. The model suggests that under deferred executive compensation policies, managers exhibit an increasing level of effort in every period Furthermore, the deferred compensation policy encourages managers to make long-term investments, which might generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.