A Characterization for Dominant Strategy Implementation

作     者：Jesse A. Schwartz Quan Wen 

作者机构：Department of Economics Finance and Quantitative Analysis Kennesaw State UniversityKennesaw GA 30144 USA Department of Economics Vanderbilt University Nashville TN 37235-1819 USA 

出 版 物：《Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities》 (中国高等学校学术文摘·经济学（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2013年第8卷第1期

页      面：1-18页

学科分类：12[管理学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 08[工学] 0701[理学-数学] 

主　　题：perfect price discriminating (PPD) dominant strategy implementation,Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms public good provision bilateral bargaining 

摘      要：We introduce a perfect price discriminating mechanism for allocation prob- lems with private information. A perfect price discriminating mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any perfect price discriminating mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully report her private infor- mation. We establish a characterization for dominant strategy implementation： Any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy implemented using a perfect price discriminating mechanism. We apply this charac- terization to derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good provision and bilateral bargaining.