Research on Alliance Decision of Dual-Channel Remanufacturing Supply Chain Considering Bidirectional Free-Riding and Cost-Sharing

作     者：Lina Dong Yeming Dai 

作者机构：School of BusinessQingdao UniversityQingdaoChina 

出 版 物：《Computer Modeling in Engineering & Sciences》 (工程与科学中的计算机建模（英文）)

年 卷 期：2024年第140卷第9期

页      面：2913-2956页

核心收录：

学科分类：0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 

基　　金：This work was supported by the Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China(No.20YJA630009) Shandong Natural Science Foundation of China(No.ZR2022MG002) 

主　　题：Dual-channel remanufacturing supply chain alliance remanufactured products bidirectional free-riding cost-sharing 

摘      要：This study delves into the formation dynamics of alliances within a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)that encom-passes a manufacturer,a retailer,and an e-commerce *** leverages Stackelberg game for this exploration,contrasting the equilibrium outcomes of a non-alliance model with those of three differentiated alliance *** non-alliance model acts as a crucial benchmark,enabling the evaluation of the motivations for various supply chain entities to engage in alliance *** analysis is centered on identifying the most effective alliance strategies and establishing a coordination within these *** thoroughly investigate the consequences of diverse alliance behaviors,bidirectional free-riding and cost-sharing,and the resultant effects on the optimal decision-making among supply chain *** findings underscore several pivotal insights:(1)The behavior of alliances within the supply chain exerts variable impacts on the optimal pricing and demand of its *** comparison to the non-alliance(D)model,the manufacturer-retailer(MR)and manufacturer-e-commerce platform(ME)alliances significantly lower both offline and online resale prices for new and remanufactured *** adjustment leads to an enhanced demand for products via the MR alliance’s offline outlets and the ME alliance’s online platforms,thereby augmenting the profits for those within the ***,retailer-e-commerce platform(ER)alliance tends to increase the optimal retail price and demand across both online and offline *** specific conditions,alliance behavior can also increase the profits of non-alliance members,and the profits derived through alliance channels also exceed those from non-alliance channels.(2)The prevalence of bidirectional free-riding behavior largely remains constant across different alliance *** these models,bidirectional free-riding typically elevates the equilibrium prices in offline channel while negatively affe