Prescribed-Time Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Pursuit-Evasion Game
作者机构:Key Laboratory of Measurement and Control of Complex Systems of EngineeringMinistry of EducationNanjing 210096 School of AutomationSoutheast UniversityNanjing 210096China Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringMissouri University of Science and TechnologyRollaMO 65409 USA IEEE
出 版 物:《IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica》 (自动化学报(英文版))
年 卷 期:2024年第11卷第6期
页 面:1518-1520页
核心收录:
学科分类:12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学]
基 金:supported in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China(BK20231417,BK20210214) the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62273094,62203114) the“Zhishan”Scholars Programs of Southeast University
主 题:seeking prescribed convergence
摘 要:Dear Editor,This letter is concerned with prescribed-time Nash equilibrium(PTNE)seeking problem in a pursuit-evasion game(PEG)involving agents with second-order *** order to achieve the prior-given and user-defined convergence time for the PEG,a PTNE seeking algorithm has been developed to facilitate collaboration among multiple pursuers for capturing the evader without the need for any global ***,it is theoretically proved that the prescribedtime convergence of the designed algorithm for achieving Nash equilibrium of ***,the effectiveness of the PTNE method was validated by numerical simulation results.A PEG consists of two groups of agents:evaders and *** pursuers aim to capture the evaders through cooperative efforts,while the evaders strive to evade *** is a classic noncooperative *** has attracted plenty of attention due to its wide application scenarios,such as smart grids[1],formation control[2],[3],and spacecraft rendezvous[4].It is noteworthy that most previous research on seeking the Nash equilibrium of the game,where no agent has an incentive to change its actions,has focused on asymptotic and exponential convergence[5]-[7].