Supplier Development under Supply Risk and Reputational Risk
作者机构:School of ManagementXiamen UniversityXiamen361005China School of Economics and ManagementTsinghua UniversityBeijing100084China
出 版 物:《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 (系统科学与系统工程学报(英文版))
年 卷 期:2024年第33卷第3期
页 面:360-388页
核心收录:
学科分类:12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)]
基 金:supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)under Grant No.72271208 the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant No.2023M741907
主 题:Supplier investment supplier development supply risk reputational risk dual sourcing
摘 要:This paper considers the supplier investment decision-making problem in a supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer(OEM),a global supplier,and a local *** reduce dependence on global suppliers and improve supply stability,we develop a differential game model to investigate the optimal investment decisions of the OEM towards the local supplier under different risk scenarios and the impact of different risks on the optimal *** results show that investment efficiency and risks have a significant impact on OEM investment ***,when the OEM has higher investment efficiency,investing in the local supplier is profitable for the OEM;conversely,when the investment efficiency of the OEM is lower,it does not *** addition,an increase in the supply risk of the global supplier will lower the entry threshold for OEM investment,but an increase in the supply risk of the local supplier and the reputational risk of both will increase this threshold,meaning that only the OEM with significantly higher investment efficiency can profit.