Design and pricing of maintenance service contract based on Nash non-cooperative game approach

作     者：SU Chun HUANG Kui SU Chun;HUANG Kui

作者机构：School of Mechanical EngineeringSoutheast UniversityNanjing 211189China 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics》 (系统工程与电子技术（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2024年第35卷第1期

页      面：118-129页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71671035) 

主　　题：maintenance service contract Nash game incentive and penalty mechanism corrective maintenance preventive maintenance 

摘      要：Nowadays manufacturers are facing fierce *** from the products,providing customers with multiple maintenance options in the service contract becomes more popular,since it can help to improve customer satisfaction,and ultimately promote sales and maximize profit for the *** considering the combinations of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance,totally three types of maintenance service contracts are ***,attractive incentive and penalty mechanisms are adopted in the *** this basis,Nash non-cooperative game is applied to analyze the revenue for both the manufacturer and customers,and so as to optimize the pricing mechanism of maintenance service contract and achieve a win-win *** experiments are *** results show that by taking into account the incentive and penalty mechanisms,the revenue can be improved for both the customers and ***,with the increase of repair rate and improvement factor in the preventive maintenance,the revenue will increase gradually for both the parties.