Fixed-Time Consensus-Based Nash Equilibrium Seeking

作     者：Mengwei Sun Jian Liu Lu Ren Changyin Sun Mengwei Sun;Jian Liu;Lu Ren;Changyin Sun

作者机构：the Institutes of Physical Science and Information TechnologyAnhui UniversityHefei 230601China IEEE the School of Automation and the Key Laboratory of Measurement and Control of Complex System of EngineeringMinistry of EducationSoutheast UniversityNanjing 210096China the School of Artificial Intelligence and the Engineering Research Center of Autonomous Unmanned System TechnologyMinistry of EducationAnhui UniversityHefei 230601China 

出 版 物：《IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica》 (自动化学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2024年第11卷第1期

页      面：267-269页

核心收录：

学科分类：07[理学] 070104[理学-应用数学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62373107,61921004,62303009) the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China(BK20202006) the“Zhishan”Scholars Programs of Southeast University。 

主　　题：Fixed seeking letter 

摘      要：Dear Editor,This letter examines the fixed-time stability of the Nash equilibrium(NE)in non-cooperative games.We propose a consensus-based NE seeking algorithm for situations where players do not have perfect information and communicate via a topology graph.The proposed algorithm can achieve NE in a fixed time that does not depend on initial conditions and can be adjusted in advance.