CEOs’Diverse Career Experiences and the Effectiveness of Compensation Contracts:Evidence from Compensation Stickiness
作者机构：School of Business AdministrationNortheastern UniversityShenyang110169China
出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 (系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2024年第33卷第1期
页 面：52-76页
核心收录：
学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)]
基 金：the National Social Science Fund of China under grant No.21BGL017
主 题：CEOs’diverse career experiences effectiveness of compensation contracts compensation stickiness agency problems incentive mechanisms
摘 要：CEO compensation stickiness represents an important indicator to measure the effectiveness of compensation *** study uses CEO career experience data and compensation stickiness data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 to investigate the compensation contracts’effectiveness of CEOs with diverse career *** findings are as follows:1)Compensation stickiness is more pronounced for CEOs with diverse career *** to the mechanism test,these CEOs with diverse career experiences can obtain compensation incentives by reducing corporate uncertainty perception and improving total factor *** approach leads to increased compensation stickiness and the effectiveness of compensation *** with diverse career experiences may receive excess compensation by raising agency costs,which intensifies compensation stickiness and weakens the effectiveness of compensation contracts.2)Compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant in companies with lower investor protection,which brings about less effective compensation *** contrast,in companies with higher diversification,the compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant,which delivers more effective compensation *** conclusions deepen the research of CEO compensation contracts and provide a helpful reference for CEO compensation management practices.
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