Side-Channel Analysis for the Re-Keying Protocol of Bluetooth Low Energy
作者机构：School of Electronic Information and Electrical EngineeringShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghai 200240China
出 版 物：《Journal of Computer Science & Technology》 (计算机科学技术学报（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2023年第38卷第5期
页 面：1132-1148页
核心收录：
学科分类：080904[工学-电磁场与微波技术] 0810[工学-信息与通信工程] 0809[工学-电子科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 08[工学] 080402[工学-测试计量技术及仪器] 0804[工学-仪器科学与技术] 081001[工学-通信与信息系统]
基 金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.62072307
主 题：Bluetooth low energy(BLE/BTLE) long term key re-keying protocol side-channel analysis
摘 要：In the era of the Internet of Things,Bluetooth low energy(BLE/BTLE)plays an important role as a wellknown wireless communication *** the security and privacy of BLE have been analyzed and fixed several times,the threat of side-channel attacks to BLE devices is still not well *** this work,we highlight a side-channel threat to the re-keying protocol of *** protocol uses a fixed long term key for generating session keys,and the leakage of the long term key could render the encryption of all the following(and previous)connections *** attack exploits the side-channel leakage of the re-keying protocol when it is implemented on embedded *** particular,we present successful correlation electromagnetic analysis and deep learning based profiled analysis that recover long term keys of BLE *** evaluate our attack on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor(Nordic Semiconductor nRF52840)running Nimble,a popular open-source BLE *** results demonstrate that the long term key can be recovered within only a small amount of electromagnetic ***,we summarize the features and limitations of our attack,and suggest a range of countermeasures to prevent it.
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