A New Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

作     者：ZHANG En CAI Yongquan ZHANG En;CAI Yongquan

作者机构：College of Computer Science and Technology Beijing University of Technology Beijing 100124 China College of Computer and Information Technology Henan Normal University Xinxiang 453007 China 

出 版 物：《China Communications》 (中国通信（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2010年第7卷第4期

页      面：18-22页

核心收录：

学科分类：0810[工学-信息与通信工程] 12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 08[工学] 081001[工学-通信与信息系统] 081201[工学-计算机系统结构] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：This work was supported by the National Key Basic Research Program of China (NO. 2007CB311106)  Beijing Municipal Natural Science Foundation.(No. 1102003) and Youth Science Foundation of Henan Normal University (No. 525198) 

主　　题：Secret Sharing Game Theory Verifiable Secret Sharing Resilient Equilibrium 

摘      要：In this paper,we propose a new approach for rational secret sharing in game theoretic *** trusted center is eliminated in the secret reconstruction *** player doesn’t know current round is real round or fake *** gain of following the protocol is more than the gain of deviating,so rational player has an incentive to abide the ***,every player can obtain the secret *** scheme is verifiable and any player’s cheating can not *** the proposed scheme is immune to backward induction and satisfies resilient *** player of the coalition C can do better,even if the whole coalition C *** scheme can withstand the conspiracy attack with at most m-1 players.