Collusion Potential Assessment in Electricity Markets Considering Generation Flexibility

作     者：Teng Tu Yi Ding Peng Ji Minglei Bao Nan Shang Yonghua Song Dan Zeng 

作者机构：College of Electrical EngineeringZhejiang UniversityHangzhou 310027China Beijing Power Exchange Center Co.Ltd.Beijing 100000China the Institute of Energy Strategy and PolicyChina Southern Power GridGuangzhou 510663China State Key Laboratory of Internet of Things for Smart CityUniversity of MacaoTaipaMacao SARChina China Electric Power Research InstituteNanjing 210037China. 

出 版 物：《CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems》 (中国电机工程学会电力与能源系统学报（英文）)

年 卷 期：2023年第9卷第4期

页      面：1551-1566页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 080802[工学-电力系统及其自动化] 0808[工学-电气工程] 081104[工学-模式识别与智能系统] 08[工学] 0835[工学-软件工程] 0811[工学-控制科学与工程] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：supported in part by the Science and Technology Project of SGCC Technical report on multi-objective global optimal allocation model and strategy research of power trading in the new era under Grant No.SGZJ0000KXJS1900181 

主　　题：Collusionpotentiale conomiccdispatch generation flexibility ramp rates strategic withholding. 

摘      要：The collusion among various generating units has been a problematic issue affecting the fairness and transparency of electricity ***,it is of great significance to assess the potential of such collusion in the electricity ***,the previous assessment studies primarily focused on the bidding behaviors of collusive generating units,without considering the influences of generation flexibility,such as ramp *** this paper,a novel assessment method is proposed to evaluate the collusion potential in the electricity market considering generation ***,a bi-level optimization model is developed to simulate the collusive strategies of dif-ferent generating units,including the withholding of generation capacities and ramp rates,as well as the uplifting of minimum outputs and bidding *** the upper-level problem,collusive generating units optimize their offering strategies to optimize the generation profits without violating the regulatory *** lower-level problem is a day-ahead economic dispatch model which minimizes the dispatching *** on the optimal collusive strategies determined by the bi-level model,a framework is then proposed to assess the collusion potential in electricity ***,price-based and profit-based indices are proposed to quantitatively evaluate the collusion potential of different generating ***,the proposed assessment method is validated on a modified IEEE 39-node *** numerical results demonstrated that generation flexibility can be exploited collusively for making excessive profits,particularly during load peaks and *** Terms-Collusionpotential,economic cdispatch,generation flexibility,ramp rates,strategic withholding.