Evolutionary games and spatial periodicity

作     者：Te Wu Feng Fu Long Wang 

作者机构：Center for Complex SystemsXidian UniversityXi’anChina Department of MathematicsDartmouth CollegeHanoverNHUnited States of America Center for Systems and ControlCollege of EngineeringPeking UniversityBeijingChina 

出 版 物：《Journal of Automation and Intelligence》 (自动化与人工智能（英文）)

年 卷 期：2023年第2卷第2期

页      面：79-86页

学科分类：07[理学] 0701[理学-数学] 070101[理学-基础数学] 

基　　金：support from NSFC,China(62036002,62273226)is gratefully acknowledged supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities,Xidian University,China(JB210414) 

主　　题：Spatial games Evolutionary dynamics Periodic cycles Kaleidoscopic cooperation Spatial reciprocity 

摘      要：Spatial interactions are considered an important factor influencing a variety of evolutionary processes that take place in structured *** still remains an open problem to fully understand evolutionary game dynamics on networks except for certain limiting scenarios such as weak *** we study the evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection where strategy evolution of individuals becomes deterministic in a fashion of winners taking *** show that the long term behavior of the evolutionary process eventually converges to a particular basin of attraction,which is either a periodic cycle or a single fixed state depending on specific initial conditions and model *** particular,we find that symmetric starting configurations can induce an exceedingly long transient phase encompassing a large number of aesthetic spatial patterns including the prominent kaleidoscopic *** finding holds for any population structure and a broad class of finite games beyond the Prisoner’s *** work offers insights into understanding evolutionary dynamics of spatially extended systems ubiquitous in biology and ecology.