Evolutionary game-based optimization of green certificate-carbon emission right-electricity joint market for thermal-wind-photovoltaic power system

作     者：Ran Wang Yanhe Li Bingtuan Gao Ran Wang;Yanhe Li;Bingtuan Gao

作者机构：School of Electrical EngineeringSoutheast UniversityNo.2 SipailouNanjing 210096P.R.China State Grid Qinghai Electric Power CompanyNo.89 Shengli StreetXining 810001P.R.China 

出 版 物：《Global Energy Interconnection》 (全球能源互联网（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2023年第6卷第1期

页      面：92-102页

核心收录：

学科分类：0820[工学-石油与天然气工程] 02[经济学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 0808[工学-电气工程] 020204[经济学-金融学（含∶保险学）] 

基　　金：supported by the National Key R&D Program of China(2017YFB0902200). 

主　　题：Electricity market Carbon emission right Green certificate Evolutionary game 

摘      要：With the increasing proportion of renewable energy in the power market,the demands on government financial subsidies are gradually increasing.Thus,a joint green certificate-carbon emission right-electricity multi-market trading process is proposed to study the market-based strategy for renewable energy.Considering the commodity characteristics of green certificates and carbon emission rights,the dynamic cost models of green certificates and carbon rights are constructed based on the Rubinstein game and ladder pricing models.Furthermore,considering the irrational bidding behavior of energy suppliers in the actual electricity market,an evolutionary game based multi-market bidding optimization model is presented.Subsequently,it is solved using a composite differential evolutionary algorithm.Finally,the case study results reveal that the proposed model can increase profits and the consumption rate of renewable energy and reduce carbon emission.