Cooperation and Contract Design in Project Management with Outsourcing

作     者：Xiaoqiang Cai Nicholas G.Hall Siyi Wang Feng Zhang Xiaoqiang Cai;Nicholas G.Hall;Siyi Wang;Feng Zhang

作者机构：School of Data ScienceThe Chinese University of Hong KongShenzhen518172China Shenzhen Research Institute of Big DataShenzhen518172China Department of Operations&Business AnalyticsFisher College of BusinessOhio State UniversityColumbusOhioUSA School of Science and EngineeringThe Chinese University of Hong KongShenzhen518172China Suning BankNanjing210019China 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 (系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2023年第32卷第1期

页      面：34-70页

核心收录：

学科分类：0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 

基　　金：supported by Leading Talent Program of Guangdong Province(Project No.2016LJ06D703) the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project No.72192805),and the Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation Commission(Project No.JCYJ20210324115604012) supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Key Research Grant 71732003) the Summer Fellowship Program of the Fisher College of Business,The Ohio State University 

主　　题：Project management with outsourcing subcontracting cooperative game contract design 

摘      要：We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required *** execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcontractors,as well as contract design by the prime contractor to incentivize the *** modeling the subcontractors’coordination problem as a cooperative game,we develop a profit sharing scheme to facilitate the subcontractors’*** consider two contract designs for the prime contractor:a uniform contract across all subcontractors,and a nonuniform one that customizes incentives for each *** propose efficient algorithms to solve the implicit optimization problems for optimal contract *** experiments show that the pooling effect of subcontractors’cooperation mitigates the negative impact of poor estimates about the crashing cost and resource *** observe three unexpected results through the randomized computation experiments:(i)the subcontractors’profits may decrease if they provide false information;(ii)it is safer for the prime contractor to overestimate subcontractors’crashing costs than underestimate them;and(iii)uniform contracts deliver more project profit for the subcontractors in the coalitions.