Impacts of Platform’s Omnichannel Coupons on Multichannel Suppliers
作者机构：School of ManagementHefei University of TechnologyHefei230009China Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision-MakingMinistry of EducationHefei230009China
出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 (系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2023年第32卷第1期
页 面：71-99页
核心收录：
学科分类：0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 020205[经济学-产业经济学]
基 金：supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China(NSSFC) under Grant No.18BGL265
主 题：Omnichannel coupon promotion e-commerce platform game theory
摘 要：While coupons that can be redeemed only in online channels have been issued by e-commerce platforms for decades, a new type of platform’s coupons, i.e., omnichannel coupons, which can be redeemed in both online and store channels, is gaining popularity with the rise of the omnichannel retail mode. It is interesting to explore the conditions under which omnichannel coupons are more advantageous to platforms and multichannel suppliers that sell products through platforms and physical stores. Two game models are developed in two cases where an e-commerce platform offers single channel coupons or omnichannel coupons for a multichannel supplier. Two scenarios are considered: one in which a consumer’s valuation of a product that fits his or her need is homogeneous and another in which the valuation is heterogeneous. Equilibrium outcomes show that under the homogeneous scenario, the product price and coupon face value in both coupon modes increase with the product’s fit probability when the cross-selling revenue is high, while decrease with the product’s fit probability when the cross-selling revenue is low. However, under the heterogeneous scenario, the price in both modes increases with the product’s fit probability only when the supplier’s loss from returns is low and the cross-selling revenue is high, and the coupon face value always decreases with the product’s fit probability. Compared with single channel coupons, omnichannel coupons may lead to a higher product price under certain conditions. Furthermore, omnichannel coupons can lead to higher total demand and benefit both the platform and the supplier if and only if the product’s fit probability is low and the supplier’s loss from returns is high. An extension shows that the platform’s preference for omnichannel coupons is weakened when the supplier offers a partial refund policy.
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