Competition vs cooperation:renewable energy investment under cap-and-trade mechanisms

作     者：Wei Chen Jing Chen Yongkai Ma 

作者机构：College of Management ScienceChengdu University of TechnologyChengdu 610059China Rowe School of BusinessDalhousie UniversityHalifaxNS B3H 4R2Canada School of Management and EconomicsUniversity of Electronic Science and Technology of ChinaChengdu 611731China 

出 版 物：《Financial Innovation》 (金融创新（英文）)

年 卷 期：2022年第8卷第1期

页      面：2079-2106页

核心收录：

学科分类：0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 

基　　金：support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71531003) Philosophy and Social Science Research Fund of Chengdu University of Technology(YJ2021-QN005) Center for Trans-Himalaya Studies(KX2022B01) 

主　　题：Cap-and-trade mechanism Renewable energy investment Competitive market Cooperative market 

摘      要：This paper explores the incentives of investment in renewable energy of two utility firms who compete or cooperate under either a cap-and-trade grandfathering mechanism(GM)or benchmarking mechanism(BM).We find that utility firms will invest in renewable energy more under BM than under GM,in both competitive and cooperative markets,and they will invest more in a competitive market than in a cooperative market,under either GM or ***,utility firms will produce more electricity and generate more total carbon emissions under BM than under *** profits of two firms,however,are higher in cooperative market than in competitive *** government will benefit from implementing a BM to encourage utility firms to invest in renewable energy in a competing market.