Sensitive Information Protection Model Based on Bayesian Game

作     者：Yuzhen Liu Zhe Liu Xiaoliang Wang Qing Yang Guocai Zuo Frank Jiang 

作者机构：School of Computer Science and EngineeringHunan University of Science and TechnologyXiangtan411201China Hunan Key Laboratory for Service computing and Novel Software TechnologyXiangtan411201China College of computer and information engineeringHunan University of Technology and BusinessChangshaChina School of Computer Science and Information EngineeringGuangzhou Maritime UniversityGuangzhouChina Hunan Software Vocational and Technical UniversityXiangtanChina School of Engineering and ITUniversity of New South WalesNSWAustralia 

出 版 物：《Computers, Materials & Continua》 (计算机、材料和连续体（英文）)

年 卷 期：2022年第73卷第10期

页      面：883-898页

核心收录：

学科分类：0809[工学-电子科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 08[工学] 0805[工学-材料科学与工程（可授工学、理学学位）] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：This work was supported by Key project of Hunan Provincial Education Department(20A191) Hunan teaching research and reform project(2019-134) Cooperative Education Fund of China Ministry of Education(201702113002,201801193119) Hunan Natural Science Foundation(2018JJ2138) Hunan teaching research and reform project(2019) Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province(2020JJ7007). 

主　　题：Sensitive information game theory Bayesian equilibrium sensitive level information entropy 

摘      要：A game measurement model considering the attacker’s knowledge background is proposed based on the Bayesian game theory aiming at striking a balance between the protection of sensitive information and the quality of service.We quantified the sensitive level of information according to the user’s personalized sensitive information protection needs.Based on the probability distribution of sensitive level and attacker’s knowledge background type,the strategy combination of service provider and attacker was analyzed,and a game-based sensitive information protection model was constructed.Through the combination of strategies under Bayesian equilibrium,the information entropy was used to measure the leakage of sensitive information.Furthermore,in the paper the influence of the sensitive level of information and the attacker’s knowledge background on the strategy of both sides of the game was considered comprehensively.Further on,the leakage of the user’s sensitive information was measured.Finally,the feasibility of the model was described by experiments.