Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation study on enterprise green technology innovation

作     者：XIE Kun ZHANG Zheng-luan 

作者机构：School of Economics and ManagementShanghai Institute of TechnologyShanghai 201418CHINA 

出 版 物：《Ecological Economy》 (生态经济（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2022年第18卷第1期

页      面：42-56页

学科分类：120202[管理学-企业管理（含：财务管理、市场营销、人力资源管理）] 12[管理学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 083305[工学-城乡生态环境与基础设施规划] 08[工学] 09[农学] 0903[农学-农业资源与环境] 0833[工学-城乡规划学] 

主　　题：enterprise green technology innovation evolutionary game the MATLAB simulation 

摘      要：By constructing the evolutionary game model among the government,enterprises and consumers,the paper analyzes the condition that the profit and loss relationship of the game subjects and their behavior strategies reach the stable state in the green technology innovation system,and uses MATLAB to conduct data simulation *** results show that the government,enterprises and consumers have path-dependent behavior *** larger the government incentive coefficient and subsidy coefficient is not the better,but the larger the subsidy and subsidy coefficient will hinder the green technology *** punitive measures will promote green technology innovation,but high innovation subsidies will restrain the government’s environmental ***,the government should further improve environmental regulation policies,increase enterprises’enthusiasm for green technology innovation and consumers’acceptance of green products,and promote the development of green technology innovation.