Two-level supply chain models with imperfect quality items when demand influences price and marketing promotion

作     者：Rita Yadav Sarla Pareek Mandeep Mittal Mahesh Kumar Jayaswal 

作者机构：Department of Mathematics and StatisticsBanasthali VidyapithBanasthaliIndia Department of MathematicsAmity Institute of Applied SciencesAmity University Uttar PradeshNoidaIndia 

出 版 物：《Journal of Management Analytics》 (管理分析学报（英文）)

年 卷 期：2022年第9卷第4期

页      面：480-495页

核心收录：

学科分类：0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 0714[理学-统计学（可授理学、经济学学位）] 0701[理学-数学] 

主　　题：game theory imperfect quality items supply chain co-operative game non-cooperative games 

摘      要：The present paper studies a supply chain model with items that are of imperfect quality and with the assumption that end demand is responsive to price and promotion *** seller delivers items to the buyer in a *** an inspection process,it is observed that few articles produced are not of perfect *** defects might be the result of common operations or static *** defective items are then collected and are sold at a lower/discounted *** this paper,supply chain models are developed to approve the interaction among the players,in the supply chain *** interaction between the players is demonstrated by non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretical *** non-cooperative approach,optimal solutions are attained by game theoretic approaches named as Seller–Stackelberg and Buyer–*** the cooperative approach,a Pareto efficient solution is *** the last,numerical illustrations with sensitivity scrutiny are presented to support the theory of the present paper.