Pricing and ordering strategies in a two-echelon supply chain under price discount policy:a Stackelberg game approach
作者机构：Department of MathematicsNational Institute of Technology SilcharSilcharAssamIndia
出 版 物：《Journal of Management Analytics》 (管理分析学报（英文）)
年 卷 期：2021年第8卷第4期
页 面：646-672页
核心收录：
学科分类：0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 0714[理学-统计学（可授理学、经济学学位）] 0701[理学-数学]
基 金：Ministry of Education, India, MoE National Institute of Technology, Silchar, NITS
主 题：centralized supply chain decentralized supply chain discount pricing Stackelberg game iso-elastic price sensitive demand
摘 要：Supply chain management coordinates different strategies for the production *** manufacturer requires some incentive schemes to motivate the retailer to change his policy,optimal for the whole *** paper suggests a discount mechanism by which companies can coordinate their ordering and pricing strategies throughout a supply chain model with a single manufacturer and single ***,the demand curve is iso-elastic price *** members have decided their selling price and order quantity jointly and independently to maximize the supply chain profit.A coordination mechanism is proposed based on quantity discounts to correlate pricing and ordering strategies *** decentralized case is analyzed under the manufacturer-Stackelberg game *** result of numerical investigation shows that the suggested discount mechanism has improved the supply chain profit as well as each channel member’s profit in comparison with the centralized and decentralized decisions without discount.
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