A Bounded Commitment in Vertical Collaborations of New Product Development

作     者：Zehui GE Zhengkun REN Qiying HU Yiheng JIA Zehui GE;Zhengkun REN;Qiying HU;Yiheng JIA

作者机构：School of Economics and ManagementUniversity of Science and Technology BeijingBeijing 100083China School of ManagementFudan UniversityShanghai 200433China 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science and Information》 (系统科学与信息学报（英文）)

年 卷 期：2021年第9卷第2期

页      面：154-174页

核心收录：

学科分类：120202[管理学-企业管理（含：财务管理、市场营销、人力资源管理）] 12[管理学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 

基　　金：the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71871016 71671046 71729001) 

主　　题：new product development R&D cooperation supply chain management commitment opportunistic behavior 

摘      要：Uncertainty is a main source of opportunistic behaviors in research and development cooperations,which challenges strategic decisions ranging from investments to *** avoid opportunism arising in cooperations,commitments(either formal contracts or informal communications)are generally made in advance by members of an ***,how does a commitment encourage R&D investments and ultimately enhance the total performance,without loss of flexibility in ex post operations?This study attempts to answer this by investigating a bounded commitment in the context of vertical collaborations in a supply *** this exploratory study,a 3-stage game model is used(by backward induction)to examine a two-echelon supply chain under a bounded commitment in *** analysis shows that upstream R&D investment is stimulated more and that both members are better off under the bounded *** the same time,when the relative bargaining power between the supplier and the manufacturer falls into an appropriate area,it is possible to reach a bounded commitment,and the manufacturer is more sensitive to this ***,the bounded commitment restrains opportunistic behaviors,but there is no strong sign that an increase in the ratio of the order outside the chain to the inside one can make firms better.