Dividend or No Dividend in Delegated Blockchain Governance:A Game Theoretic Analysis

作     者：Dapeng Pan J.Leon Zhao Shaokun Fan Ziqiong Zhang 

作者机构：School of ManagementHarbin Institute of TechnologyHarbin150001China School of Management and EconomicsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong(Shenzhen)Shenzhen518172China College of BusinessOregon State University488 Austin HallCorvallisOR9733USA 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 (系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2021年第30卷第3期

页      面：288-306页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 

基　　金：The authors acknowledge the support of research funds from the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.U1811462,71850013,91846301,72031001 and 71932002 Fok Ying-Tong Education Foundation for Young Teachers in the Higher Education Institutions of China under Grant No.151082 Shenzhen Special Fund for Strategic Emerging Industries Development under Grant No.JCYJ20170818100156260 Hong Kong ITF Fund under Grant No.GHP/142/18GD and National Key R&D Program of China under Grant No.2017YFC1601903 

主　　题：Delegated proof of stake consensus algorithm blockchain Hotelling model evolutionary game 

摘      要：Delegated blockchain governance is the frontier of blockchain design issues that is to improve the scalability of blockchain *** proof of stake(DPoS)blockchains such as EOS must select a few super nodes for transaction *** particular,the blockchain community has debated recently on whether dividend should be allowed when electing super nodes,which might be considered as unethical or unfair,leading to an open research topic and a new research gap that has theoretical value for both academia and *** this paper,we build a theoretical framework to study how dividend affects user decisions and welfare in a DPoS *** on game theory,we propose a three-player Hotelling model with two policies to study the behaviors of voters and *** first use a static game analysis to show that the benefits of dividend for voters and for candidates vary with the size of reward and there exists an interval,in which the zero dividend policy would be good for the welfare of both candidates and ***,we use an evolutionary game analysis to examine the process dynamics of super node selection,we find that the campaign strategy of candidates has to do with the size of platform reward given to the candidates by the blockchain *** in the asymmetric case,we find that higher level of platform reward turns to benefit candidates with large number of votes even *** findings are instrumental for designing dividend policies in DPoS blockchains and can stimulate more potential research in blockchain governance.