Accidentally True Beliefs and the Williamsonian Mental State of Knowing

作     者：LI Qilin LI Qilin

作者机构：Department of Philosophyand Institute of Foreign PhilosophyPeking UniversityBeijing 100871China 

出 版 物：《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》 (中国哲学前沿（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2021年第16卷第1期

页      面：104-120页

学科分类：0502[文学-外国语言文学] 050201[文学-英语语言文学] 05[文学] 

基　　金：supported by the National Social Sciences Fund of China(project no.14CZX038) the Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences in Universities by the Ministry of Education of China(project no.16JJD720003) 

主　　题：knowing Gettier problem mental states externalism true belief Williamson knowing is a state of mind epistemological 

摘      要：In this paper,I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind(KSM).Using the fake barn case,I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind(i.e.,accidentally true beliefs).Then,some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed,implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM ***,I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising,which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.